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1 Introduction
In most OECD countries, as well as in many developing countries, the potential bene-
fits from foreign direct investment (FDI) in the form of higher employment, intensified
competition in product markets, and positive productivity spillovers on other sectors of
the economy are increasingly perceived by policy makers. The employment argument,
in particular, has become a highly important one. In many OECD countries employ-
ment in multinational firms now accounts for more than 25% of total employment in
the manufacturing sector.1 At the same time, multinational firms are able to choose
among an increasing number of potential investment locations, particularly in Eastern
Europe and Southeast Asia, which offer low wages, an educated workforce, and rapidly
expanding domestic markets. This has led to a number of highly publicised cases of
plant relocations from rich OECD countries to lower-cost regions. A recent example
is the telecommunications firm Nokia, which announced the closure of its production
unit in the German city of Bochum in early 2008 while at the same time opening up a
new production plant in Romania.
As a result of these developments the competition among potential host countries to
attract internationally mobile firms has tightened visibly during the last decades. This
can be seen in the corporate tax changes, in particular the reductions of statutory
tax rates, that many countries have undertaken since the 1980s (see Devereux et al.,
2002). A second and even more direct indicator is the increasing use of direct location
subsidies that are paid to foreign firms. Table 1 lists 22 cases for the period from 2001 to
2007 where substantial investment subsidies (above Euro 20 million) have been offered
by host countries and approved by the European Commission. These subsidies often
account for up to 30% of the present value of the investment, and in some cases for
even more.2
A striking fact in Table 1 is that the highest subsidies are paid for firms that engage
1In 2005, employment in multinational firms as a percentage of total manufacturing employment
was, for example, 33.1% in Belgium, 26.4% in France, 15.2% in Germany, 48.0% in Ireland, 33.8% in
Sweden, 27.6% in the United Kingdom and 11.2% in the United States. See OECD (2008).
2Note that the subsidy payments collected in Table 1 cover only direct monetary transfers and
thus represent merely a lower bound for the overall value of the incentive package. The latter often
includes additional measures, such as the free provision of public infrastructure.
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Table 1: Approved investment subsidies in EU member states (2001-2007)
Date of Host country State aid Aid inten-
Company (sector) approval (city/region) (million e) sity (%)a
Nissan 01/2001 U.K. (Sunderland) 60b 18.6
Volkswagen 07/2001 Germany (Dresden) 75 12.3
Daimler Chrysler 12/2001 Germany (Thuringia) 57 30.9
Infineon (semiconductors) 04/2002 Germany (Saxony) 219 19.8
ST Microelectronics 04/2002 Italy (Sicily) 542 26.3
Iveco (utility vehicles) 10/2002 Italy (Puglia) 109 44.0
BMW 12/2002 Germany (Leipzig) 363 30.1
Solar World (solar cells) 03/2003 Germany (Saxony) 73 35.0
European Optic Media 06/2003 Germany (Thuringia) 35 35.0
Volkswagen 06/2003 Spain (Navarra) 20 6.4
Ford 07/2003 Belgium (Genk) 45 4.2
AMD (microelectronics) 02/2004 Germany (Saxony) 545c 22.7c
Wacker (silicon wafers) 02/2004 Germany (Saxony) 120 28.0
Infineon (semiconductors) 03/2004 Portugal (Porto) 42 29.0
DHL Airways (logistics) 04/2004 Germany (Leipzig) 70 28.0
DOW PET (synthetics) 04/2004 Germany (Saxony) 28 23.4
e-glass (glass) 04/2004 Germany (Saxony-Anh.) 42 35.0
Peugeot Citroen 09/2004 U.K. (Ryton) 30b 9.8
De Tomaso (vehicles) 01/2005 Italy (Calabria) 81 60.0
Su¨dzucker (bioethanol) 06/2005 Germany (Saxony-Anh.) 43 23.8
AMD (microelectronics) 07/2007 Germany (Saxony) 262 11.9
Kia Motors 12/2007 Slovakia (Stredne´ Sl.) 32 15.0
a present value of state aid divided by present value of investment
b 1 British Pound is converted to 1.5 e c upper limit
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities, C and L (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)
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in regions characterised by weak economic activity and high unemployment, but si-
multaneously are part of countries with strong trade unions that succeed in keeping
up wages even in low-productivity regions. This is true, in particular, for Eastern Ger-
many and Southern Italy, where the collective bargaining coverage rate is above 80%
of the workforce.3 This suggests that fiscal policies are used to compensate investors
for the location disadvantages of facing high wages without benefitting from positive
spillovers in an industrial core region. To some extent this reflects the European Union’s
regulations on state aid, which specify that location subsidies are only permitted to
compensate investors for a demonstrated cost disadvantage in comparison to a feasible
alternative location. The question remains, however, why unionised countries are also
willing to provide high subsidies, the cost of which have to be fully borne by them.4
More generally, governments and trade unions in host countries face similar constraints
in that wage increases and higher taxes may both lead to discontinuous losses of pro-
duction when multinational firms threaten to relocate production to countries with
lower gross-of-tax costs. It can thus be expected that these two players will respond
to each other’s policies to attract multinational firms, or to keep them in the country.
Interestingly, this interdependence of the tax/subsidy decisions of governments and the
wage policies of trade unions in the competition for FDI has so far received very little
attention in the academic literature.
Our analysis aims, therefore, to study how the presence of a domestic union affects the
incentives of governments to grant tax concessions, or even direct investment subsidies,
in order to attract FDI. In particular, we will argue in this paper that investment
3In contrast, this coverage rate (the percentage of employees for whom the wage negotiated by
the union is binding) is only around 50% in the UK and well below 20% in the USA (Cahuc and
Zylberberg, 2004, p. 372). See also Freeman (2007) for an account of the differences in labour market
institutions in the OECD and elsewhere.
4A further interesting question is why more than 80% of the subsidies to industry in the OECD take
the form of investment subsidies, rather than direct subsidies to employment, even if their purpose
is to counteract labour market rigidities (see Fuest and Huber, 2000, Table 1). One answer to this
question is that employment subsidies may strengthen the position of trade unions, whereas investment
subsidies can induce more competition in both product and labour markets. Fuest and Huber (2000)
show, in a model where firms with different productivities bargain with unions over both wages and
employment, that an investment subsidy financed by a labour tax increases the number of active firms
and generates welfare gains by reducing the rents of workers.
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subsidies can be used to affect the policy of trade unions, offering them more incentives
to exert wage restraint in exchange for higher employment. We develop this result in
a model where a unionised and a non-unionised country, which additionally differ in
size, compete for the location of a single outside firm. We show that the government
of the unionised country has a greater incentive to attract the foreign firm, in order
to ‘tame’ the domestic union’s wage demands. This results in the unionised country’s
government offering a tax discount (or a subsidy premium) to an outside firm in excess
of what is needed to compensate the investor for the higher wages caused by union
power. In equilibrium, therefore, the unionised country will be able to attract the FDI
even if it has a further location disadvantage through a smaller home market.
Our analysis relates to two different strands in the literature. The first set of papers
analyses tax competition for FDI in models of imperfectly competitive product markets
and with various country asymmetries. This ‘bidding-for-firms’ literature was initiated
by Black and Hoyt (1989), and it has since been applied to tax/subsidy competition
between countries that differ in size (Haufler and Wooton, 1999), factor endowments
(Davies, 2005), or the number of domestic competitors (Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006). A
general finding of this literature is that countries can tax the profits of an internationally
mobile firm to the extent that they possess a location advantage, relative to their
closest competitor.5 Related results have been derived in the ‘new economic geography’
literature where agglomeration effects and a larger market size give the core country a
competitive advantage and allow it to tax positive location rents (see Kind et al., 2000;
Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Ottaviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Borck and Pflu¨ger,
2006). None of these models, however, incorporates trade unions as an additional player
in the competition for FDI.
A second and parallel strand in the literature has focused on the effects that unionisa-
tion has on foreign direct investment.6 Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991) investigate the
role of unionisation in a firm’s exporting versus FDI decision. As recently shown by
5Ferrett and Wooton (2005) show that when there are two internationally mobile firms, rather than
only one, the taxing power of the competing countries is increased. Under some conditions they will
even be able to extract all profits from the duopolistic firms.
6These contributions are part of a more general literature that analyses the interaction between
unionisation, imperfect competition in goods markets, and economic integration. See e.g. Brander and
Spencer (1988), Huizinga (1993), Driffill and van der Ploeg (1995), and Naylor (1998).
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Mukherjee (2008), these two modes of serving a foreign market may also be simultane-
ously chosen by a cost-minimising firm when labour markets are unionised. Leahy and
Montagna (2000) analyse how foreign direct investment is affected by different degrees
of wage setting centralisation. Naylor and Santoni (2003) show, among other results,
that foreign direct investment is less likely in a given country the greater is its union’s
bargaining power. The same effect is also present in the economic geography model of
Munch (2003). Lommerud et al. (2003) show that unionisation can induce foreign direct
investment and lead to job losses in the unionised country and this scenario becomes
more likely as economic integration proceeds. All these papers, however, consider only
trade unions and firms while ignoring government tax policies.
In this paper we combine the decisions of firms, trade unions and governments in a
tax competition setting where governments move first and are thus able to influence
the policy of trade unions. Since unionisation emerges as a location disadvantage from
the previous literature, one would expect that a country with stronger unions needs
compensating location advantages, such as an agglomeration of industry, or a large
market size, in order to attract FDI. This is indeed the outcome in the fair wage
model of Egger and Seidel (2007), the only other paper we are aware of to combine
unionisation and tax competition in a model with endogenous location decisions of
mobile firms.7 In their model, however, the labour market distortion is exogenously
given by the fair wage preferences of workers. We will show in this paper that results
change fundamentally when the extent of the labour market distortion can be affected
by government tax policy. It is then possible that the unionised country also offers
the smaller home market, yet still attracts the outside firm through large investment
subsidies.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the general
set-up of the model. Section 3 deals with the location and output decisions of firms.
7Skaksen (2005) analyses the incentives for a single country to attract a foreign firm to a unionised
market with a domestic incumbent. This model focuses on complementarities between the outputs
produced by the incumbent and the mobile firm, however, and does not incorporate location compe-
tition between two potential host countries. There is also a small literature on tax and social policy
competition when labour markets are unionised and capital is internationally mobile (see Lejour and
Verbon, 1996 or Fuest and Huber, 1999). In this literature product markets are perfectly competitive
and thus there are no distinct output and location decisions of individual firms.
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Section 4 analyses the wage policies pursued by the trade union. Section 5 turns to the
tax and subsidy decisions of the two governments. Section 6 discusses the robustness
of our results with respect to alternative model assumptions. Section 7 concludes.
2 The model
We consider a model of two countries i ∈ {A,B} which compete for the entry of a
firm from a third country C. There are two sectors in each of countries A and B,
an imperfectly competitive sector x and a perfectly competitive nume´raire sector z.
Countries A and B differ in two respects. First the imperfectly competitive sector x is
unionised in country A, but not in country B. Second, the two countries are generally
of different size. The population of countries A and B taken together is normalised to
unity and is assumed to be immobile across countries. A share n of the total population
lives in country A, whereas 1 − n residents live in country B. Prior to the potential
entry of the outside firm, there is one active firm in the x industry in each of countries
A and B. Let a and b denote the existing firms in A and B, respectively, whereas c is
the potential entrant. Good x is a homogeneous good so that the outputs of all firms
operating in this industry are perfect substitutes.
The existence of an incumbent (immobile) domestic firm is central to our model, as it
gives the union in country A the option to receive a wage surplus from employment
in this firm, should firm c decide not to locate in country A. In the absence of such
an outside option, the union in country A holds no bargaining power towards coun-
try A’s government. As a result, the equilibrium wage rate in country A would be at
the competitive level, and the union would become irrelevant. To maintain the sym-
metry between the two countries with respect to market structure, we assume that an
incumbent firm in sector x also exists in country B.
The resulting duopolistic market structure implies, however, a considerable increase in
the complexity of our model. We deal with this by assuming, in the main part of our
analysis, that countries A and B do not trade good x with each other. This assumption
enables us to maintain asymmetries between countries with respect to both market size
and the degree of unionisation while keeping the analysis highly tractable. It is shown in
the appendix, and discussed in more detail in Section 6, that the analysis is completely
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analogous and results are qualitatively unchanged, if costly trade is permitted between
countries A and B. Intuitively, in the absence of trade between A and B, attracting the
outside firm changes the host country’s market structure for good x from monopoly to
duopoly. If trade is permitted instead, then all three firms compete in both markets.
Nevertheless competition is more intense in the country where the foreign firm sets up
production, because the presence of trade costs acts as an imperfect shield for the firms
in one country from the competition with firms in the other country (see Horstmann
and Markusen, 1992). This shield becomes more effective as trade costs rise. Assuming
that trade costs for good x are prohibitively high will thus simply act to maximise the
differential impact that the entry of the foreign firm has on the market structure in the
host country, as compared to its competing neighbour.
In production, wages are the only variable costs in both sectors. In the competitive
nume´raire sector, 1/w¯ units of labour are needed in both countries to produce one unit
of output. There are no restrictions on trade in good z so that international arbitrage
equalises the price for this good and hence the competitive wage rate in both countries
at w¯.8 In sector x, one unit of capital is needed for each firm to produce any output.
Once this fixed factor is installed, one unit of labour produces one unit of output.
Hence, in each country the variable cost of producing good x equals the going wage
rate in this sector.
An important asymmetry in our model is that the imperfectly competitive sector x
is unionised in country A, but not in country B. Hence country A’s wage rate in the
x industry is denoted by wA (and derived in Section 4 below), whereas country B’s
wage rate in this sector is at the competitive level w¯. The going sector-specific wage
rate has to be paid by both the local firm and the potential entrant c. We assume that
the outside firm c disposes of only one unit of capital and hence can set up at most
one plant, either in country A or in country B. For example, if the fixed production
factor in sector x is interpreted as entrepreneurial services, then the foreign-owned firm
c might have only one suitable manager to run a plant in one of the two countries.
On the demand side, the preferences of households are assumed to be identical for all
8The same mechanism ties together prices and wages in international trade models when trade
costs for one of the goods, but not for the other, are parametrically varied and incorporate prohibitive
levels. See Baldwin et al. (2003, pp. 16-20).
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consumers and across countries. Per-capita utility in each country is of the quasi-linear
and quadratic form
ui = αxi − 1
2
βx2i + zi i ∈ {A,B}. (1)
Each household in both countries i ∈ {A,B} supplies one unit of labour. As only sector
x in country A is unionised, an endogenous fraction sA of country A’s workforce will
find employment in this sector at wage wA. The remainder of country A’s workforce is
employed in the z sector and earns the competitive wage w¯. Workers in country A are
homogeneous and their allocation to the two sectors is not explicitly modelled. There
are simply some ‘lucky’ workers who earn more than the competitive wage. Since the
preferences of all workers are identical, we can focus on the average income earned in
country A for most of the analysis. In country B, all workers earn the same competitive
wage w¯.
To derive the country-specific budget constraints, we assume that in each country
the profit income earned by the local firm is redistributed to the domestic worker-
consumers in equal per-capita shares. Moreover, we assume that both governments
dispose of lump-sum instruments in order to finance subsidies or, in case they are
able to tax the outside firm c, redistribute tax proceeds. With these assumptions, the
(average) per-capita budget constraints in the two countries are:
wAsA + w¯(1− sA) + (pia + tA)
n
= zA + pAxA,
w¯ +
(pib + tB)
1− n = zB + pBxB.
(2)
Here pij denotes the profits of the local firms j ∈ {a, b}, ti are the tax revenues in
country i obtained from the outside firm c (negative, if subsidies are paid) and pi is
the consumer price of good x in country i.
Maximising the representative consumer’s utility function in each country, subject to
the budget constraint, and aggregating over individuals gives the market demand func-
tions for good x:
XA =
n(α− pA)
β
; XB =
(1− n)(α− pB)
β
. (3)
These market demand functions are independent of the exogenous income components
in (2), due to the quasi-linear utility function.
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In order to examine the impact of union power on tax competition for the outside
firm, we model a three-stage game. In the first stage, the two competing governments
simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose a lump-sum tax or subsidy on the entry
of the outside firm, which represents either an ‘entry fee’ (in the case of a tax) or a
‘welcome gift’ (in the case of a subsidy).9 The objective of governments in stage one is
to maximise the overall utility of their respective population. Whether the equilibrium
tax on the entry of the outside firm is positive or negative depends on the interplay of
two counteracting forces. On the one hand, the entry of the outside firm is the only way
for each government to increase competition in sector x. On the other hand, admitting
the outside firm c to an imperfectly competitive industry implies that the industry’s
profits will be shared with foreigners.
In the second stage, the union in country A chooses the wage rate that maximises the
wage surplus of its workers, or equivalently the overall wage bill. The trade-off for the
union is that attracting the outside firm increases local output in the unionised sector,
but at the same time the union may have to moderate its wage, relative to what it
would optimally charge the domestic monopolist. Finally, in the third stage, the foreign
firm decides to enter either market A or market B (provided that net profits in this
market are positive) and output levels are chosen by all firms.
The sequence of events underlying our analysis is motivated by two observations. First,
as we have discussed in the introduction, multinational firms are becoming increasingly
footloose and can easily relocate production, if gross-of-tax production costs in a given
country make it unattractive to stay there. This implies that both governments and
unions have to take into account the possibility of losing (or not attracting) the outside
firm when making their decisions. Second, we interpret the government’s policy variable
in a wide sense, as a general policy stance towards increasing competition in local
markets by way of attracting FDI. Such a policy is clearly of a more long-term nature
than the periodic wage negotiations in which trade unions are engaged and implies that
the government of country A can strategically adjust its tax policy in order to affect
the wage claims of the local union. In Section 6 we discuss how our results are affected
by different assumptions with respect to the model’s time structure.
9Assuming lump-sum instruments is analytically convenient, but it also captures the character of
many real-world investment subsidies. See Table 1 in the introduction.
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3 Stage three: The firms
In the usual way, the model is solved by backward induction. Firms act last in our
game, basing their decisions on the taxes and wages set by the other players. Firms
a and b, the domestic incumbents, will decide about their output quantities, taking
account of the simultaneous decisions of the outside firm. Firm c decides where to
locate and then produces the same quantity in the chosen market as the respective
incumbent firm, since it faces the same wage rate and hence cost of production. Firms
observe market conditions according to (3) and maximise their profits. We assume that
firms compete a` la Cournot.
To derive equilibrium outputs we need to distinguish between two regimes, depending
on whether firm c locates in country A (Regime A, or RA for short) or in country B
(RB). Let superscripts denote the country in which the outside firm locates (i.e., the
regime), whereas subscripts denote the countries or firms, for which a given value is
calculated. With this notation, production quantities in the two regimes are
(RA) : xAa = x
A
c =
n (α− wA)
3 β
, xAb =
(1− n) (α− w¯)
2 β
;
(RB) : xBa =
n (α− wA)
2 β
, xBb = x
B
c =
(1− n) (α− w¯)
3 β
.
(4)
Using (3) and noting that demand for good x must equal local supply in each country
in the absence of trade yields equilibrium prices in the two regimes
(RA) : pAA = (α + 2wA)/3, p
A
B = (α + w¯)/2;
(RB) : pBA = (α + wA)/2, p
B
B = (α + 2w¯)/3.
(5)
These prices lead to regime-specific profit levels of
(RA) : piAa = pi
A
c = n (α− wA)2/(9 β), piAb = (1− n) (α− w¯)2/(4 β);
(RB) : piBa = n (α− wA)2/(4 β), piBb = piBc = (1− n) (α− w¯)2/(9 β).
(6)
Equations (5)-(6) show the effects of the location decision of the mobile firm c. Given
that the incumbent firms a and b are assumed to be internationally immobile, the entry
decision of firm c changes the market conditions in its host country from monopoly to
duopoly, reducing aggregate profits and increasing consumer surplus in this market. In
country A, a further distributional consequence is that the x sector will grow, giving
10
more workers the opportunity to earn a wage above the competitive level. This effect
will be important for the union’s wage decision below.
Firm c will be indifferent where to settle down when its net-of-tax profits are the same
in the two countries. It is ex ante unclear which country will be the more attractive
location for the outside firm, as markets are generally of different size and need not
have the same wages and taxes. The general condition for c being indifferent between
locations A and B is:
piAc − tA = piBc − tB ⇐⇒
n (α− wA)2 − (1− n) (α− w¯)2
9 β
= tA − tB.
This equation can be solved for the maximum wage that the union in country A can
charge and still make the firm no worse off than if it settled in country B. We denote
this wage by wAA and adopt the convention that the firm will locate in country A
whenever it is indifferent between the two locations.10 This critical wage depends on
the tax rates decided by both governments in the first stage:
wAA = α−
√
n
[
9 β (tA − tB) + (1− n) (α− w¯)2
]
n
. (7)
For wA ≤ wAA the firm will settle in country A, whereas for wA > wAA it will locate in
country B. The maximum wage that the outside firm c is willing to pay in country A
falls when the tax rate in country A is high or that in country B is low, and it rises
when the competitive wage w¯ (which is to be paid in country B) is high. Finally, it is
straightforward to show that wAA is rising in n, as the outside firm will want to settle
in the larger market, other things being equal.
4 Stage two: The union
There are two widely used models of trade union behaviour in labour economics, the
monopoly union model (as a special case of the more general right-to-manage model)
and the efficient bargaining model. Both of these models are able to explain some, but
not all, of the stylised facts in labour markets (Oswald, 1993). In the more narrowly
10In addition, the outside firm c must also make positive profits in its preferred location. We will
show below that this is always the case in equilibrium.
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related literature on the interaction between unionisation and FDI, however, virtually
all contributions employ the monopoly union model. This approach is a benchmark
for wage determination with maximum union power, allowing firms only to adjust
quantities optimally in a later stage of the game. Stated differently, the union chooses
its optimal point on the firms’ labour demand curve. We also adopt the monopoly
union approach in this paper. One specific advantage of this model in our framework
is that it eliminates the possibility of strategic behaviour on the part of the incumbent
firm in country A.11 Even with the simple monopoly union model, the trade-off faced
by the union is enriched in our analysis as wage restraint will not only increase the
output of the incumbent firm, but it may also induce the outside firm c to settle in the
country, thus further expanding local production of good x.
The union’s objective is to maximise the domestic wage surplus over the competitive
wage bill.12 Denoting this wage surplus by Ω we get
max
wA
Ω = nsA(wA − w¯) = XA(wA − w¯), (8)
where sA is the share of country A’s population working in the x sector and the last
equality follows from the market clearing condition for good x. Again we have to
derive the optimal union policy separately for the cases where the outside firm settles
in country A or in country B. We assume that the union is interested only in the
nominal wage and neglects the effects of its wage setting behaviour on the output price
in sector x. One motivation for this assumption is that the number of workers in the
x sector is small, relative to country A’s overall population. Hence most of the output
of good x is consumed by workers in the nume´raire sector z, whose well-being does
not enter the objective function of the sector-specific union. Alternatively, it could be
argued that the nominal wage is the relevant indicator by which the union’s leaders
measure the ‘success’ of their wage setting decision.
11Giving the incumbent firm some power to decide on the wage rate, as in an efficient bargaining
model, would imply that firm a faces the following trade-off. If the firm agrees to a higher local wage,
its costs of production will rise, but at the same time the higher wage may prevent the entry of the
outside firm. The additional effects arising in this more general setting of wage determination are
interesting in their own right, but they are beyond the scope of the present analysis.
12It is seen from equation (8) that this objective is equivalent to maximising the total wage bill.
The latter is obtained by adding the constant term nw¯ to the wage surplus expression.
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We start the analysis of the union’s wage setting decision in Regime B. In this regime
only the domestic incumbent produces good x in country A and total output is given
by XA = x
B
a in (4). From (8), the wage rate that maximises the objective function of
the union is then
wBA =
(α + w¯)
2
, (9)
resulting in a wage surplus for the union in country A equal to
ΩBA =
n (α− w¯)2
8 β
. (10)
If firm c settles instead in country A, the union cannot charge a higher wage than wAA,
as given in (7). In this case the wage rate is thus bound from above by the condition
to attract the outside firm. Let us assume for the moment that the upper bound (7)
is indeed binding and hence the union will not find it optimal to charge a wage below
wAA, whenever it wants the firm to settle in country A. Total production of good x is
then XA = x
A
a + x
A
c [see eq. (4)]. Substituting into (8), the union’s wage surplus when
it sets the wage according to (7) is
ΩAA =
2
3β
[
√
n (α− w¯)− δ ] δ , (11)
where
δ ≡
√
9β(tA − tB) + (1− n)(α− w¯)2 . (12)
The union in country A compares the wage surplus in the case where it is able to attract
the outside firm, and in the case where it chooses instead the ‘outside option’ of letting
the firm go to country B and extracting a high wage from the domestic monopolist.
Hence the union compares ΩAA in (11) with Ω
B
A in (10). Since the term δ includes the tax
differential tA − tB, the union’s decision of whether to attract the outside firm will be
affected by the tax rates that governments choose in the first stage. Setting ΩAA = Ω
B
A
yields the maximum tax differential that will still induce the union to set the wage wAA
and hence attract the outside firm in equilibrium. This higher critical value for the tax
differential (superscript H) is13
(tA − tB)H = (25n− 16)(α− w¯)
2
144β
. (13)
13Equation (11) is quadratic in the tax differential so that there are two solutions for (tA− tB) that
solve ΩAA = Ω
B
A . Since we are searching for the highest possible tax differential that is compatible with
an equilibrium in Regime A, only the larger of these two solutions is relevant.
13
As long as tA − tB is less than this critical value, the union will be better off (or at
least as well off) with the outside firm and hence the location equilibrium will be in
Regime A. Once tA−tB surpasses the critical threshold in (13), the union will no longer
try to attract the outside firm and will instead set wBA according to (9). In this case
the location equilibrium will thus be in Regime B.
At this stage we cannot exclude the possibility that the union will find it optimal to
charge a wage below the maximum wage that is compatible with a location equilibrium
in Regime A. In other words we also have to consider the case where the constraint
wA < w
A
A is not binding. In this case the union’s optimising behaviour in Regime A
gives
∂ΩAA
∂wA
=
2n(α + w¯ − 2wA)
β
= 0 ⇔ w˜AA =
α + w¯
2
, (14)
where w˜AA denotes the union’s unconstrained wage optimum in Regime A. This wage
rate corresponds to the union’s optimal wage in Regime B [eq. (9)]. We can thus
derive a lower threshold (superscript L) for the tax differential, which is defined by the
equality of wAA in (7) and w˜
A
A in (14). This is
(tA − tB)L = (20n− 16)(α− w¯)
2
144β
. (15)
Since wAA is falling in (tA− tB) whereas w˜AA is independent of taxes, any tax differential
below this critical value implies that w˜AA < w
A
A. In this case the tax rate in country
A is so low, relative to that of country B, that the union is not constrained by the
condition to attract the outside firm. It optimally chooses w˜AA according to (14) and
since this wage is below wAA, the outside firm will surely locate in country A. We label
this case Regime A2. In contrast, we denote by Regime A1 the case where the union’s
wage policy is determined by (7) and hence the condition to attract the outside firm is
binding. We can then characterise the equilibrium wage policy of country A’s union in
each of the three regimes B, A1 and A2, as a function of the tax differential decided
by governments in the first stage. Starting with high values of (tA − tB) gives:
(RB) : wA = w
B
A = (α + w¯)/2 if (tA − tB) > (tA − tB)H ;
(RA1) : wA = w
A
A = α− (δ
√
n/n) if (tA − tB)L ≤ (tA − tB) ≤ (tA − tB)H ;
(RA2) : wA = w˜
A
A = (α + w¯)/2 if (tA − tB) < (tA − tB)L;
(16)
where δ is given in (12) and (tA − tB)H and (tA − tB)L are given in (13) and (15).
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5 Stage one: The governments
In the first stage of the game, the two governments choose a lump-sum tax or subsidy
on the entry of the outside firm. We assume that each government maximises the sum of
utilities of the worker-consumers in its jurisdiction. The optimal policy for each country
is derived by comparing the welfare levels in the case where the country hosts the firm
and in the case where it does not. National welfare in each country is obtained from
the individual utility functions (1), where the per-capita budget constraints (2) are
used to substitute out for zi.
14 Employing the first-order condition of the consumers’
optimisation problem and aggregating over households in the two countries gives the
following national welfare measures:
UA = n uA = (α− pA)XA
2
+ ΩA + nw¯ + pia + tA; (17a)
UB = (1− n)uB = (α− pB)XB
2
+ (1− n)w¯ + pib + tB. (17b)
It is then straightforward to show that if country A attracts the outside firm, the
equilibrium must be in Regime A1 and it lies at the borderline to Regime B.
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium where country A attracts the firm, the tax differen-
tial is given by (tA− tB)H in (13) and the union sets the wage according to wAA in (7).
Proof: See Appendix 1.
The intuition for this result is as follows. First, it is straightforward to see that the
equilibrium can never be in Regime A2. In this regime the wage rate is given by w˜AA
in (14), which in turn is below wAA in (7). Setting the wage below w
A
A implies, however,
that the union leaves a location rent to the outside firm, in excess of what is needed
to attract it to country A. This is anticipated by country A’s government, which raises
tA and thus brings down w
A
A until w˜
A
A = w
A
A. This tax increase will not raise the level
of the equilibrium wage and its only effect is to increase country A’s tax revenue at
the expense of firm c’s profits. This clearly must be beneficial for country A. The
14Note that in country A the per-capita budget constraints, and hence the per-capita utility levels
uA, must be interpreted as weighted averages of the incomes and utilities of unionised and non-
unionised workers.
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second part of the proof shows that optimal tax policy in country A always implies
an equilibrium at the boundary of Regimes A1 and B, rather than in the interior of
Regime A1. Intuitively, wAA is the union’s optimal wage policy in Regime A1, which
is a falling function of (tA − tB). Therefore a tax rise in country A reduces the wage
rate and hence the distortion in sector x, as the entry tax for the outside firm does not
distort output decisions at the margin. In sum, therefore, the government of country A
will fully exploit its taxing power vis-a`-vis both the domestic union and the foreign
firm. In any equilibrium in Regime A the union in country A will thus receive no rent
over and above the wage surplus that it obtains in Regime B, and the outside firm will
only obtain the net profits that it could also earn in country B.
We can exploit the implication of Proposition 1 that the union’s wage surplus is equal
in Regimes A and B to get ΩAA = Ω
B
A = n(α−w¯)2/(8β). Substituting this along with (3)
and pAA and pi
A
a from (5) and (6) into (17a) yields country A’s welfare in Regime A as
a function of the two tax rates:
UAA = 4tA − 3tB +
(8− 5n)(α− w¯)2
24β
+ nw¯. (18a)
In Regime B, welfare in country A is instead derived using pBA and pi
B
a from (5) and (6)
along with (10) and tA = 0 in (17a). This gives
UBA =
7n(α− w¯)2
32β
+ nw¯. (18b)
Setting UAA = U
B
A and noting that U
A
A is a rising function of tA gives the best offer
(denoted by a superscript o) that country A’s government is willing to make to the
outside firm c. This is the minimum tax that country A is willing to accept, or the
maximum subsidy that it is willing to pay, in order to host this firm:
toA =
1
4
[
3tB +
(α− w¯)2
96β
(41n− 32)
]
. (19)
Country A’s best offer toA can be positive or negative. It is a rising function of tB since a
higher entry tax in country B raises the wage rate that country A’s union charges in a
Regime A equilibrium [see eq. (7)]. The resulting efficiency losses must be compensated
by a higher lump-sum tax (or a lower subsidy), in order to make Regime A at least as
attractive as Regime B from the perspective of A’s government.
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In a similar way we can compute the best tax offer that country B is willing to make
to the firm. In Regime A, where country B’s tax collections are zero, we substitute pAB
and piAb from (5) and (6) along with tB = 0 into (17b). This yields
UAB = (1− n)
[
3(α− w¯)2
8 β
+ w¯
]
. (20a)
Alternatively, if country B attracts the firm, we use pBB and pi
B
b from (5) and (6) in (17b).
In Regime B, national welfare in country B will then amount to
UBB = tB + (1− n)
[
(α− w¯)2
3 β
+ w¯
]
. (20b)
Setting UAB = U
B
B gives country B’s best offer:
toB =
(1− n) (α− w¯)2
24 β
. (21)
Country B’s best offer is strictly positive, i.e., it is only willing to host the firm if it
receives a positive entry fee. The reason is that the entry of the foreign firm will simul-
taneously reduce the profits by country B’s incumbent firm and lead to an efficiency
gain as the market becomes less concentrated. In equilibrium the fall in domestic profits
is the dominant effect, thus requiring positive tax receipts to compensate country B’s
residents for the fall in their profit incomes. Note also that toB is independent of tA.
This is because the interdependence of tax rates arises only through their effect on wage
policies in our model (see the discussion of toA above) and the wage rate of country B
is fixed.
The equilibrium in the bidding game is derived as follows. The two countries contin-
uously reduce their tax rates until the first country has reached its best offer and is
therefore not willing to reduce its tax rate any further. The other country will make
an offer that is marginally more attractive to the outside firm and attract the FDI.
Let us first consider under which conditions country A will attract the firm in equilib-
rium. Using Proposition 1, we can derive country A’s optimal tax policy by substituting
country B’s best offer (21) into the equilibrium tax differential (tA− tB)H in (13). This
gives the maximum (and hence optimal) tax rate that country A can charge if it wants
to attract the firm:
t∗A =
(19n− 10)(α− w¯)2
144β
. (22)
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Note that the optimal tax rate charged by country A is not necessarily positive and in
fact will be negative when countries are of equal size (n = 0.5). This reflects the fact
that country A is constrained in its tax policy by the presence of a domestic union.
Any lump-sum tax on the firm in excess of t∗A will cause the union to set a wage rate
that makes it unattractive for the foreign firm to enter market A.
Substituting country A’s optimal tax rate (t∗A) and country B’s best offer (t
o
B) into (18a)
yields country A’s maximised welfare in Regime A:
UA∗A =
(32n− 5)(α− w¯)2
72β
+ nw¯ . (23)
The final step is to compare this expression with the alternative utility level that
country A would achieve in Regime B. This shows that country A is better off with
the outside firm if and only if its market size exceeds a critical threshold:15
UA∗A > U
B
A ⇐⇒ n > nc = 4/13. (24)
Equation (24) shows that there is a range of parameter values where the unionised
country also has the smaller market, yet still attracts the outside firm in equilibrium.
It can further be verified that the outside firm indeed makes positive net profits when
locating in country A.16
In the opposite case where country B hosts the firm, the equilibrium is characterised
by country A making its best offer in (19) while country B charges the highest possible
level of tB that still attracts the firm to this country. This implies that country B
sets its tax rate such that country A’s best offer in (19) is marginally higher than
the maximum tax differential that country A can afford to attract the firm [eq. (13)].
Solving for the level of tB that equates tA in (19) and in (13) gives
t∗B =
(α− w¯)2
288β
(32− 77n) . (25)
15It is easily verified that the same result can be obtained from the condition that country A’s
optimal tax rate t∗A in (22) must be at least as high as its best offer t
o
A in (19), where the latter is
evaluated at toB in (21).
16From the gross profit expression for piAc in (6), the wage equation (16) and the two tax rates (21)
and (22), we get net profits of piAc − t∗A = 5 (1− n) (α − w)2/(72β) which is unambiguously positive.
By construction, this is the same level of net profits that the outside firm could earn in country B.
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Country B will attract the outside firm if it marginally underbids this level of tax.
Substituting in (20b) yields country B’s maximised welfare in Regime B
UB∗B =
(α− w¯)2
288β
(128− 173n) + (1− n)w¯. (26)
To see whether country B will benefit from hosting the firm, we compare (26)
with (20a), or alternatively t∗B in (25) with t
o
B in (21). Consistent with the above result,
either method shows that country B is willing to host the firm when n < nc = 4/13.
Taken together, these results determine the equilibrium location of the outside firm and
the equilibrium tax rate imposed by the host country for each of the different values
of the country size parameter n. For n ≥ 4/13 country A will host the firm and the
equilibrium tax rate is given by (22). In contrast, when n < 4/13 country B hosts the
firm and the equilibrium tax rate is given by (25). We summarise our results in
Proposition 2 In the tax/subsidy game between two countries that differ with respect
to union power and size, there is a critical market size parameter nc = 4/13 such that
for all n ≥ nc the unionised country (country A) attracts the outside firm in equilibrium,
whereas for n < 4/13 the non-unionised country (country B) hosts the firm.
The result in Proposition 2 is surprising at first glance as the unionised country seems
to be at a disadvantage in the location competition for the outside firm. In the absence
of a union, it is always the larger country which wins the competition for an outside
firm (Haufler and Wooton, 1999; Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006).17 First intuition would thus
suggest that the unionised country A needs to have a larger market than country B
in order to attract the FDI. Proposition 2 shows, however, that exactly the opposite is
true and having a union can indeed offset a (limited) size disadvantage that country A
has vis-a`-vis country B. The reasoning underlying this result is that country A has
a stronger incentive to attract the outside firm, as this will help in moderating the
wage claims of the domestic union. In country B only the product market distortion
17This result can also be demonstrated in our framework when the wage rate in country A is set
at the competitive level w¯. In this case the highest tax rate that each country can charge and still
attract the outside firm c are t∗A = (pi
A
c − piBc )− (UBB −UAB ), which equals [(13n− 5)(α− w¯)2]/(72β);
and t∗B = (pi
B
c −piAc )− (UAA −UBA ) = [(8−13n)(α− w¯)2]/(72β). This shows that country A can afford
the higher tax, and will attract the investment in equilibrium, whenever n > 0.5.
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is ameliorated when the foreign firm c enters the market. In country A, however, the
efficiency gain is further raised by the fact that the unionised wage will fall when
the foreign firm enters the market. Substituting (21) and (22) in (16) shows that the
equilibrium wage in Regime A is
wA∗A =
(α + 3w¯)
4
= w¯ +
(α− w¯)
4
. (27)
The equilibrium wage in Regime A is above the competitive level, but it is unambigu-
ously lower than the wage rate that the union would set in Regime B [see eq. (16)].
This additional benefit of hosting the outside firm is reflected in the bid of country A’s
government.
The greater likelihood to attract the outside firm does not imply, however, that coun-
try A also has the higher per-capita welfare in equilibrium. Instead we get the stark
result that per-capita welfare is always lower in country A, in either of the two possible
regimes and for any distribution of population size. This is summarised in
Proposition 3 In either Regime A or Regime B, and for any level of n < 1, per-
capita welfare in the unionised country (country A) is less than per-capita welfare in
the non-unionised country (country B).
Proof: In Regime A, dividing UA∗A in (23) by n and U
A
B in (20a) by (1 − n) shows
that UA∗A /n < U
A
B/(1 − n) ∀ n ≥ 4/13, where n ≥ 4/13 holds in Regime A from
Proposition 2. In Regime B we divide UBA in (18b) by n and U
B∗
B in (26) by (1 − n).
This gives UBA /n < U
B∗
B /(1− n) ∀ n < 4/13, where n < 4/13 holds in Regime B. ¤
A simple way to explain this result is to compare the different ways in which countries
A and B can (partly) extract the profits from the outside firm, if it locates in their
jurisdiction. In country B only the tax instrument is available for this purpose, but this
instrument causes no allocative distortions. In country A, in contrast, profit extraction
occurs through a mix of higher wages and lump-sum taxes. Since the wage instrument is
distortive but must nevertheless be used in order to ensure the compliance of the union,
country A’s set of instruments to capture the outside firm’s profits is less efficient, on
average. Since the overall level of profit extraction is fixed for both countries by the
arbitrage condition that governs firm c’s location choice, these efficiency losses translate
into a lower per-capita welfare level in country A.
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Figure 1: Per-capita welfare as a function of population size
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Figure 1 summarises the per-capita welfare levels in both countries for different distri-
butions of population size. The graph shows that for each country per-capita welfare
is higher when this country attracts the outside firm, and within this regime the host
country’s welfare is rising in the local population size. This is because the location of
the outside firm generates additional rents and the host country is able to capture an
increasing share of these rents when its market size advantage vis-a`-vis the competing
region grows. Finally Figure 1 shows that per-capita welfare in country B is above that
of country A for all interior distributions of population size 0 < n < 1.
Lastly, we show that even though unionisation leads to the average per-capita welfare
in country A being below that in country B, the unionised workers in country A are
better off than they would be in the absence of the union. This result holds under the
condition that the share of workers in the x sector does not exceed a critical threshold.
Proposition 4 If the share of workers in the unionised sector is below a critical value
scA = 4/9, the per-capita welfare of unionised workers in country A is higher than in
the absence of the union. This holds true in both regimes and for all n < 1.
Proof: See Appendix 2.
21
Proposition 4 shows that the union creates winners and losers in country A, but the
gains to unionised workers are lower than the losses to the non-unionised workers in
the nume´raire sector (see Proposition 3). The upper limit on the size of the unionised
sector ensures that the efficiency losses caused by the union will not be so large as to
thwart the redistributive gains to workers in sector x. We have already assumed above,
in deriving the objective function of the union [eq. (8)], that the share of workers in
the x industry is small. With this constraint unionisation is thus indeed beneficial for
those workers in country A that receive the higher union wage.
6 Robustness of results
In this section we examine the robustness of our results when some of the model as-
sumptions are changed. In Appendix 3 we analyse the case where trade in good x takes
place, but per-unit transport costs τ are incurred when shipping goods between coun-
tries A and B. The basic mechanisms of this extended model are completely analogous
to our analysis in the previous sections. All calculations are considerably more tedious,
however, due to the dependence of prices and quantities on the trade cost parameter
and on wages in both countries. To limit the complexity of the resulting expressions
we confine the analysis in Appendix 3 to the case where countries are of equal size
(n = 0.5).18 For this case we show that the unionised country will attract the firm in
equilibrium. By continuity, this result will continue to hold for small differences in coun-
try size. Hence the qualitative result in Proposition 2 carries over to an extended model
with trade between countries A and B. Moreover, it is also shown in Appendix 3 that,
for n = 0.5, the unionised country has lower per-capita welfare than the non-unionised
country. Hence Proposition 3 also carries over to a model with costly trade, at least
when countries are of similar size.
A second issue is whether and how the results of our model are affected when the
sequence of play is altered.19 One alternative scenario is that the union’s decisions are
18A further simplifying assumption made in Appendix 3 is that exogenous trade costs are low enough
so that the union cannot shut down trade by choosing sufficiently high wages. This last possibility is
explicitly analysed in Lommerud et al. (2003).
19The set of results for these alternative time structures is available from the authors upon request.
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of a longer-term nature than tax policies and hence the union in country A chooses
the wage rate before the two governments set taxes. The result that the unionised
country can attract the firm, even if it has the smaller market, carries over to this
alternative setting. In fact, the critical size parameter nc, at which the switch between
Regimes A and B occurs, is exactly the same as in our benchmark analysis. This can
be explained as follows. When the union has the first-mover advantage it is able to
appropriate the rents that arise from the location of the outside firm. Hence the union
will voluntarily moderate wages in order to attract the firm, if this increases its wage
surplus. At the critical level of country size nc no rents arise for any player so that
the different order of moves has no further consequences. For n > nc the changed
sequence does matter, however, as the union can now charge the maximum wage at
which country A’s government is still willing to set the tax sufficiently low to attract
the firm. In comparison to our benchmark case, this will lead to higher wages and thus
a lower average utility in country A.
Let us now consider a scenario where the outside firm has already settled in one of
the countries before country A’s union chooses the local wage rate. This implies that
FDI can be attracted by lump-sum location subsidies, but once the investment has
been made it is locked in the country and only the output level can be adjusted to a
rise in wage costs. Tax rates are thus determined in the first stage, the outside firm’s
location choice is made in the second stage and the wage in country A is set in the third
stage. In the fourth and final stage the three firms choose output levels, given that the
location of all firms has already been fixed. In this case the union will set the same
monopoly wage in Regimes A and B, as the outside firm is immobile at the time when
the wage rate in country A is chosen. Hence tax policy is unable in this case to induce
wage moderation. As a result, country A’s government is no longer willing to offer the
firm a subsidy that fully compensates the firm for the higher wage in country A and
the critical market size at which the unionised country attracts the firm in equilibrium
rises above n = 0.5. Moreover, average welfare in country A is lower in this case than in
any of the other scenarios. The general lesson from these alternative sequences of play
is that wage moderation can still be expected when unions move prior to governments,
but it is crucial that mobile firms can react with their location decisions to the wage rate
they face in the unionised country. As we have discussed above, however, multinational
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firms have increased opportunities to relocate production across countries and many
examples show that they also use this opportunity. Hence unions do in fact have to
take this constraint into account.
As a final note, we have chosen the most straightforward way to model asymmetric
union power by assuming that a union is present in country A whereas the labour
market in country B is competitive. We expect our results to carry over qualitatively
to the case where a union is also present in country B, but it is less powerful than that
of country A. If union power is fully symmetric in countries A and B the model will
again lead to the well-known result that the larger country attracts the investment,
other things being equal.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have analysed a model of tax competition between two countries that
differ with respect to both market size and the degree of unionisation. This model leads
to the seemingly counterintuitive result that market power in the labour market raises
the likelihood that the unionised country attracts an internationally mobile firm. More
precisely, the unionised country can win the foreign direct investment in equilibrium
even if it offers the smaller market, as long as the disadvantage in market size is not too
large. The core reason underlying this result is that the government of the unionised
country will provide a generous tax environment to the firm as a means to induce wage
moderation from its domestic union. Foreign direct investment plays a crucial role in
this process because it offers a discrete increase in employment opportunities when the
union ‘cooperates’ in attracting the mobile firm. We have also argued that the basic
result holds regardless of whether trade occurs between the competing countries or not,
and whether tax policies or wage policies are set first.
Our analysis may help explain why high investment subsidies are commonplace in
locations with high wages and union power. It also offers the testable hypothesis that a
higher degree of union power will lead to more generous tax and subsidy policies towards
foreign direct investment. For the United States, there is indeed some empirical support
for the proposition that a higher degree of unionisation leads to more foreign direct
investment, other things being equal (see Coughlin et al., 1991). A more direct test
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of our central result would be to regress the equilibrium levels of taxes and subsidies,
rather than the level of foreign direct investment, on a suitable indicator of union
power.
Our model can be extended in several directions. One possible route is to widen the set
of policy instruments in the hands of governments and to include distortionary taxes.
We would expect that the overall policy package in the unionised country would still
be more generous towards foreign direct investment than the incentives granted by
a country with (more) competitive labour markets. Hence the unionised country will
again attract more FDI, other things being equal. However, when only distortionary
taxes can be used to capture the outside firm’s profits, then it is no longer clear that
profit extraction by means of higher wages is inferior from an efficiency perspective.
Hence in such a model the unionised country will not necessarily have a lower per-
capita welfare in equilibrium. A second possible extension is to relax the assumption
of a monopoly union and replace it by a bargaining game between the union and the
firm(s). Giving the incumbent firm in the unionised country the power to bargain over
wages will add a further strategic dimension to the model, as the incumbent may accept
higher wages in order to keep foreign competitors out of its home market. This is an
issue that we want to address in future research.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1
To derive country A’s welfare in Regime A we first calculate XA = x
A
a + x
A
c = 2n(α−
wA)/(3β) from (4). Using this in the wage surplus definition (8) and substituting the
resulting expression along with pAA and pi
A
a from (5) and (6) into (17a) yields
UAA =
n
3β
(α− wA) (α+ wA − 2w¯) + nw¯ + tA. (A.1)
In Regime A2, substitute w˜AA from (16) into (A.1). This yields
UA2A =
n
4
(α− w¯)2 + nw¯ + tA.
Hence ∂UA2A /∂tA = 1 throughout Regime A2, implying that it is optimal for country A’s
government to raise taxes until Regime A1 is reached.
In Regime A1, substitute wAA from (16) into (A.1). This yields
UA1A =
δ
3β
[
2
√
n(α− w¯ − δ]+ nw¯ + tA.
Differentiating with respect to tA gives
∂UA1A
∂tA
=
2
3β
[√
n(α− w¯ − δ] ∂δ
∂tA
+ 1 > 0,
since the term in the squared bracket equals ΩAA/δ > 0 and ∂δ/∂tA > 0 from (11).
Hence, in Regime A1, country A’s government will raise taxes until the borderline to
Regime B is reached. This implies that country A sets its tax according to (13). ¤
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 4
To compare the unionised workers’ welfare in the presence and in the absence of a
trade union, three cases have to be distinguished: (i) if 0 < n < 4/13 the equilibrium
is in Regime B with and without a union in country A; (ii) if 4/13 ≤ n ≤ 0.5 the
equilibrium is in Regime A in the presence of a union, but in Regime B if there is
no union in country A; (iii) if 0.5 < n the equilibrium is always in Regime A. (cf.
footnote 17).
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In case (i) the average per-capita welfare level in country A, UBA /n [eq. (18b)], must be
decomposed into the utility of unionised and that of non-unionised workers. Since the
wage surplus of a unionised worker is (α − w¯)/2 in Regime B [eq. (9)] the per-capita
welfare of this group in country A is
uunionA =
(α− w¯)
2
[
7(α− w¯)
16β
+ (1− sA)
]
+ w¯.
Alternatively, in the absence of a union the per-capita welfare level in country A would
be the same as that of country B’s workers in Regime A, which equals UAB/(1− n) in
eq. (20a). Hence in case (i) the per-capita welfare differential for unionised workers in
country A is
∆uiA =
(α− w¯)
2
[
7(α− w¯)
16β
+ (1− sA)− 3(α− w¯)
4β
]
,
which is falling in sA. Setting this difference equal to zero yields an upper limit for
the share of workers in sector x equal to siA = 1 − [5(α − w¯)/(16β)]. Moreover, in a
Regime B equilibrium it must hold that siA = x
B
a /n = (α − w¯)/(4β), where the first
equality holds because one worker is needed to produce one unit of good x and the
second equality follows from substituting (9) in (4). Combining the two equations gives
the case-specific critical value siA = 4/9.
In case (ii), the per-capita welfare level of a unionised worker in country A is derived
from the average per-capita utility UA∗A /n in (23), and the wage surplus in Regime A,
which is (α − w¯)/4 [eq. (27)]. Alternatively, in the absence of a union the per-capita
welfare level in country A is again given by UAB/(1 − n) in eq. (20a). This yields a
per-capita welfare difference for unionised workers in this case equal to
∆uiiA =
(α− w¯)
4
[
(32n− 5)(α− w¯)
18βn
+ (1− sA)− 3(α− w¯)
2β
]
.
This welfare difference is rising in n so that the case-specific minimum occurs at n =
4/13. Substituting this value and equalising the two utilities yields a critical upper
bound for sA equal to s
ii
A = 1− [5(α− w¯)/(8β)]. Moreover, in a Regime A equilibrium
it must hold that sA = (x
A
a + x
A
c )/n = (α − w¯)/(2β), where we use (27) and (4).
Combining the two equations gives siiA = 4/9 as the strictest case-specific condition.
Finally, in case (iii) the per-capita welfare of a unionised worker from having the union
is again derived from (23) and (27). The level in the absence of the union is obtained
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by using (20b), duly replacing (1 − n) by n and replacing tB by t∗A, where t∗A is given
in footnote 17. This yields a per-capita welfare difference for unionised workers of
∆uiiiA =
(α− w¯)
4
[
(32n− 5)(α− w¯)
18βn
+ (1− sA)− (37n− 5)(α− w)
18βn
]
.
Setting this difference equal to zero yields siiiA = 1 − [5(α − w¯)/(18β)]. Since sA =
(xAa +x
A
c )/n = (α−w¯)/(2β) holds again in this case, the critical value is siiiA = 9/14. The
upper bound on the share of unionised workers which ensures that each worker benefits
from the union, irrespective of the level of n, is thus scA = min{siA, siiA, siiiA } = 4/9. ¤
Appendix 3: The model with trade
We adopt the segmented market hypothesis in the framework of a ‘reciprocal dumping’
model a` la Brander and Krugman (1983). For expositional ease, we assume countries
to be of equal size, i.e. n = 0.5. We assume that trade costs are below the prohibitive
level so that two-way trade always takes place. The game in the last stage is changed
in that there are now three active firms in both markets. With per unit trade costs of
τ , solving the third stage of the game yields firm- and regime-specific profits of
piAa = pi
A
c =
(α− 2wAA + w¯ − 2τ)2
32β;
+
(α− 2wAA + w¯ + τ)2
32β
;
piAb =
(α+ 2wAA − 3w¯ − 3τ)2
32β
+
(α + 2wAA − 3w¯ + 2τ)2
32β
;
piBa =
(α− 3wBA + 2w¯ − 3τ)2
32β
+
(α− 3wBA + 2w¯ + 2τ)2
32β
;
piBb = pi
B
c =
(α + wBA − 2w¯ − 2τ)2
32β
+
(α + wBA − 2w¯ + τ)2
32β
.
The first terms in these expressions refer to profits in market A, whereas the second
terms give the profits in market B. By analogy to the benchmark model without trade
we can infer a wage rate in country A for which the outside firm c is just indifferent
between the two locations. This wage rate, which depends on the exogenous trade cost
parameter, taxes, and also on country A’s wage rate in Regime B is:
wAA =
1
4
[
2α + 2w¯ − τ −
√
(2α− 4w¯ − τ + 2wBA)2 + 64β(tA − tB)
]
. (A.2)
Employing our analysis in the main part of the paper (cf. Proposition 1) we assume
that the union will find it optimal to set the wage just at this level, if it wants to
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attract the firm. The union’s alternative is to forgo the outside firm and impose the
surplus-maximising wage on the domestic monopolist. The latter is given by
wBA =
1
12
(2α + 10w¯ − τ) . (A.3)
This wage rate can be substituted into (A.2). Defining the union surplus as in (8),
equating the regime-specific expressions in Regimes A and B (ΩAA = Ω
A
B), solving for
the tax differential (tA−tB) and choosing the larger of the two solutions to the quadratic
equation yields
(tA − tB)H = (3
√
6− 17)(2α− 2w¯ − τ)2
1152β
. (A.4)
This is unambiguously negative, as is eq. (13) in the main text for n = 0.5. To get coun-
try B’s best offer (toB) we use (17b), taking account of the changed quantities in the
model with trade and equate the welfare levels in the cases where country B hosts the
firm and where it does not (UAB = U
B
B ). In the presence of trade with country A, coun-
try B’s welfare depends on the trade union’s optimally chosen wage in both regimes,
and hence also on tA. Country B’s government anticipates the wages that the union
in country A will set in each regime [eqs. (A.2) and (A.3)] and it also accounts for the
fact that country A’s government sets taxes according to (A.4) in order to minimise
the union’s surplus. Using this information, country B’s best offer is
toB =
4(47− 21√6)(α− w¯)2 + τ [(72√6− 572)(α− w¯) + (1391− 15√6)τ ]
4608β
. (A.5)
From (A.4) and (A.5) we can derive country A’s optimal tax rate t∗A:
t∗A = −
4(7 + 3
√
6)(α− w¯)2 + τ [4(25− 2√6)(α− w¯)− (441−√6)τ ]
1536β
. (A.6)
Country A will attract the outside firm in equilibrium, if its welfare in the case where it
hosts the firm exceeds its welfare in the case where it does not. Using (17a) to calculate
country A’s utility in the two regimes gives
UAA − UBA =
(9
√
6− 19)(2α− 2w¯ − τ)2
2304β
> 0 (A.7)
so that country A is indeed better off if it hosts the outside firm. Hence the unionised
country will attract the firm in an equilibrium with trade when the two countries are
of equal size. This shows that Proposition 2 carries over qualitatively to a scenario
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with trade in good x. Moreover it can be shown that, for any non-prohibitive level of τ ,
(per-capita) welfare in country A is again lower than (per-capita) welfare in country B:
UAA − UAB = −
(2α− 2w¯ − τ)[2(47− 13√6)(α− w¯)− (43− 11√6)τ ]
1536β
< 0. (A.8)
Hence, for countries of equal size, Proposition 3 also extends to the case where good x
is traded between countries A and B.
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